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COMMENTS 
Bounded Evaluation: 
Cognition, Incoherence, 
and Regulatory Policy 
Cary Coglianese* 
To many observers, the words "predictably incoherent" describe well the 
fragmented network of rules and regulatory institutions that has grown up in 
the United States over the last century.1 Hundreds of federal agencies 
collectively publish thousands of new regulations each year.2 Federal 
* Associate Professor of Public Policy and Chair, Regulatory Policy Program, John F. 
Kennedy School of Government. For helpful and coherent comments on an earlier version 
of this Article, I am grateful to David Lazer, Todd Olmstead, Robert Stavins, and David 
Wei!. 
I. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADYERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 198 
(200 I )  ("Institutional fragmentation results in overlapping, imperfectly coordinated 
regulation by numerous local, state, and federal agencies, which may be dominated by 
different political parties with different regulatory policy preferences."); OFFICE OF 
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, M ORE BENEFITS, fEWER BURDENS: CREATING A REGULATORY 
SYSTEM THAT WORKS FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ( 1996), available at 
http://whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/3_year_report.html ("Given each agency's legitimate 
focus on its own mission, and the fact that the Federal government is a complex organization 
with programs dispersed among many different agencies, sub-agencies, and offices, it is not 
unusual to find regulations that are inconsistent, incompatible, or duplicative."); E. Donald 
Elliott & Gail Charnley, Toward Bigger Bubbles, 13 FORUM APPLIED RES. & PUB. POL'Y 48 
(1998) (arguing that the "fragmentation of policymaking into separate regulatory programs 
makes it virtually impossible for comparative risk priorities to be set on a rational basis that 
even approaches maximizing the social benefit from a given level of investment"); Alice M .  
Rivlin, Rationalism and Redemocratization: Time for a Truce, in WORST THINGS FIRST? 21, 
26 (Adam M. Finkel & Dominic Golding eds., 1994) ("[L]eft to its own devices, the political 
system comes up with what almost anybody would think of as bizarre answers and 
misallocations of resources-with too much spent on relatively low-risk phenomena and, at 
the same time, a relative starving of problems where the risks might be very high."). 
2. OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL, 
200112002 app. C, at 653-6 1 (200 1) (listing more than 300 federal agencies whose 
regulations appear in the Code of Federal Regulations). See also John D. Graham, Speech to 
Weidenbaum Center Forum, Presidential Management of the Regulatory State (Dec. 1 7, 
200 1 ), available at http://www. whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/graham_speech 12170 l .html 
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responsibility for food safety rests in a dozen different regulatory agencies, 
operating under at least thirty-five different statutes.3 At least eight major 
agencies are charged with responsibility for reducing the risk of exposure to 
hazardous substances under more than two dozen statutes, each with their own 
structure and standards.4 Congress has created more than 200 committees and 
subcommittees, many of which oversee the development of regulatory policy.5 
By some estimates, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has had as 
many as ninety congressional committees and subcommittees overseeing its 
work.6 
Regulatory agencies not only report to Congress, but also find themselves 
repeatedly wrangling with a variety of other actors and institutions, including 
the Office of Management and Budget, the White House, the courts, and the 
media.7 Internally, these same regulatory agencies are divided across program 
areas and by professional specialization. Moreover, the internal and external 
fragmentation of policy authority plays itself out at the level of state and local 
governments, which interact with the federal government and add another layer 
of complexity to the making and implementation of regulatory policy. Given 
the extensive fragmentation of policymaking authority, it should come as no 
surprise that regulation in the United States appears so complex and incoherent. 
In their article, Predictably Incoherent Judgments, Cass Sunstein, Daniel 
Kahneman, David Schkade, and Ilana Ritov advance a cognitive explanation 
for incoherence in government regulation. 8 They argue that decisionmakers 
tend to think within narrowly-conceived categories and have difficulty 
translating their normative judgments into concrete terms, such as dollar 
amounts.9 Both of these factors, they suggest, result in patterns of micro-level 
("(T]here are over 100 federal agencies and subagencies with regulatory mandates from 
Congress. They chum out 4,500 new rules each year."). 
3. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE & NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENSURING SAFE FOOD: 
FROM P RODUCTION TO CONSUMPTION 26 ( 1998), available at 
http://books.nap.edu/books/0309065593/html/26.html (noting that "[a]t least a dozen federal 
agencies implementing more than 35 statutes make up the federal part of the food safety 
system"). 
4. See, e.g. , STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 8 ( 1993) ("[R]egulation 
designed to screen out risky substances, including cancer-causing substances, is embodied in 
many different regulatory programs-indeed in at least twenty-six different statutes 
administered by at least eight different agencies."). 
5. DAVID C. KING, TURF WARS: How CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES CLAIM 
JURISDICTION 71 ( 1997); NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THOMAS E. MANN & MICHAEL J. MALBIN, 
VJTAL STATISTICS ONCONGRESS, 1999-2000, at 113 (2000). 
6. KING, supra note 5, at 71. 
7. See, e.g., PETER L. STRAUSS, TODD RAKOFF, ROY A. SCHOTLAND & CYNTHIA 
FARINA, GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 50 (9th ed. 
1995) (illustrating the web of institutional interactions confronting federal agencies). 
8. Cass Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Ilana Ritov, Predictably 
Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REv. 1153 (2002). 
9. Jd. 
-
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judgments that make little sense when viewed from a macro-level perspective 
across different categories. They argue that decisions that seem sensible when 
viewed in isolation, or within a single category, result in patterns that are 
globally inconsistent or suboptimal. 
Sunstein et al. rightly call attention to the effects of cognition on regulatory 
policymaking, and especially to problems associated with narrow, ad hoc 
decisionmaking. In this essay, I argue that the effects of cognitive limitations 
are probably even more pronounced than Sunstein et al. 's article suggests. 
They argue that cognitive tendencies such as category-bound thinking lead to 
incoherent regulatory policies, but I will argue that, in addition, these same 
kinds of cognitive constraints can affect judgments about incoherence itself. If 
people have a tendency to focus on one category at a time in making 
judgments, then evaluations that judge different policies to be incoherent will 
tend to be bounded as well. Consequently, it will be still more difficult than 
Sunstein et al.' s article seems to imply to design and evaluate institutional 
reforms to reduce incoherence in regulatory policy. 
In the following pages, I first introduce a tension between what I refer to as 
instrumental and comparative coherence, arguing that variation in policies that 
appears to make little sense when policies are compared with each other may 
be quite sensible for instrumental reasons. I then examine Sunstein et al. 's 
claim to have discovered striking incoherence in the penalty levels across 
regulatory statutes. I argue that when considered from a broader perspective 
the apparently obvious incoherence in some of these penalty levels is not nearly 
as obvious as it first seems. Finally, I argue that the same kind of bounded 
evaluation problem arises when regulations are judged to be incoherent based 
on variation in their cost-effectiveness. 
Regulatory policies that appear incoherent when compared along one 
dimension or evaluated with only one purpose in mind will not necessarily be 
properly viewed as incoherent once other dimensions or purposes are taken into 
account. Indeed, because the conditions underlying regulatory policy are both 
varied and complex, judgments about incoherence will be unavoidably difficult 
(and even sometimes incoherent) since regulatory policies vary along multiple 
dimensions and people have a tendency to focus only on one dimension at a 
time. 
I. CONCEPTUALIZING REGULATORY INCOHERENCE 
Fragmented regulatory institutions make it more likely that regulatory 
policy will vary in its standards, procedures, penalties, and resources, such that 
seemingly similar cases will not always be treated alike. Sunstein et al. frame 
much of their discussion of regulatory incoherence around the considerable 
variation in the civil penalties that administrative agencies can impose on those 
1220 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54: 1217 
who have violated federal statutes and regulations.10 Numerous statutes permit 
administrative agencies to impose civil, and sometimes criminal, penalties on 
regulated actors. The statutes typically provide for maximum penalties that can 
be imposed, and the pattern of maximum penalties across federal regulatory 
agencies varies considerably, from $500 to as much as $1,000,000 for certain 
criminal penalties. 11 Some statutes place maximum limits on penalties per 
violation, while others impose limits per day of violation and still others 
stipulate minimum penalties that must be imposed for certain types of 
violations. 
As Sunstein et al. note, the pattern of civil penalties across regulatory 
regimes is not something which has garnered a great deal of attention from 
scholars and policymakers.12 In 1990, for example, Congress increased the 
maximum civil penalties for OSHA violations but, as would be predicted from 
Sunstein et al. 's argument, legislators apparently failed to make any explicit 
comparison to other agencies' penalties. The legislative record only shows that 
legislators emphasized how much more revenue could be raised by increasing 
OSHA's penalties and how low the earlier penalties had been relative to the 
importance of worker safety. 
Notwithstanding the apparent lack of legislative debate comparing the size 
of different penalties, in other contexts scholars and analysts have sometimes 
paid attention to differences in the size of administratively-imposed penalties. 
One of the earliest studies of civil penalties included a chart of different 
agencies' penalties and noted the "varying amounts of money" associated with 
civil penalties that "resulted from a series of relatively unstudied, ad hoc 
legislative acts."13 More recent studies and commentary have also made 
explicit comparisons of civil penalty policies across different agencies.14 In 
10. !d. at I 186-1 194. 
II. See id. app. D, at 12 1 1- 12 13. The $500 maximum is for unknowingly violating the 
key provision of the Wild Bird Conservation Act. 16 U.S.C. § 4912(c). The $ 1  million 
maximum is a criminal penalty for organizations that knowingly transport, treat, or store 
hazardous waste without a permit and knowingly put a person in imminent danger of death 
or serious bodily injury. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e). For charts showing the variation in civil 
penalties across agencies, see Harvey J. Goldschmid, A n  Evaluation of the Present and 
Potential Use of Civil Money Penalties as a Sanction by Federal Administrative Agencies, in 
2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMfNISTR.ATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UN ITED 
STATES 896, 955-56 ( 1972) and Sunstein et al., supra note 8, at 1190, 12 1 1- 1213. 
12. See Sunstein et a!., supra note 8, at 1160. 
13. Goldschmid, supra note I I , at 956. 
14. See, e.g, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTfNG OFF ICE, IMPLEMENTAT ION OF SELECTED 
AGENCIES' CIVIL PENALlY RELIEF POLICIES FOR SMALL ENTITIES (2001) (explicitly 
comparing five federal agencies' policies for moderating civil penalties for small 
businesses); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTfNG OFFICE, VIEWS ON PROPOSED LEGISLATION ON CIV IL 
PENALTIES FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY V IOLAT IONS BY NONPROFIT CONTRACTORS, (200 1) (Mar. 
22, 200 I testimony of Gary L. Jones) (arguing against a DO E exemption of nonprofit 
contractors from penalties on the ground that the NRC and other regulatory agencies impose 
penalties on these same contractors); Testimony of Roger J. Marzulla, former Assistant 
.. 
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addition, researchers have noted the variation in civil penalties imposed by 
single agencies applying different statutes, 15 and regulatory agencies have 
sought to foster consistency in their own civil penalties by developing 
guidelines for the imposition of such penalties.16 While the Sunstein et al. 
article is by no means the first to highlight issues of consistency and coherence 
in civil penalties, variation in the size of penalties across agencies has certainly 
escaped the kind of attention that scholars and policy makers have given to 
other differences in regulatory policy, such as cross-agency variation in the 
cost-effectiveness of regulations.17 
Sunstein et al. argue that the variation they observe in civil penalties 
reveals "serious anomalies" creating significant injustice in the overall system 
of federal regulation.18 In particular, they draw attention to the disparity 
between the maximum penalties for violations of federal Occupational Safety 
and Health Act ("OSHA") regulations and the maximum penalties for 
violations of the Wild Bird Conservation Act.19 A serious violation of OSHA 
requirements can result in a civil penalty of up to $7000, while the illegal 
importation of exotic wild birds can yield a penalty as high as $25,000. 
Sunstein et al. claim that even though there is substantial coherence within each 
regulatory regime, something is awry when the penalties associated with the 
importation of exotic birds are more than three times as large as the penalties 
associated with putting workers' lives at risk. 
Other examples of varied, and potentially anomalous, penalties can easily 
be found, especially when comparing penalties for the same offense across 
different jurisdictions. Consider one of the most well known of all civil 
Attorney General, Environment and Natural Resources Division, before the House Judiciary 
Committee, Subcommittee on Commercial and Admini strative Law (May 7, 1998), 
available at 1998 WL 233950 (advocating congressional reform of criminal penalty 
provisions by arguing that regulatory "agencies rank violation of their regulations as the 
highest priority criminal offense, giving l ittle or no thought to the relationship between 
penalties imposed by that agency and [the] rest of the crimina] law regime"). See also 
William Funk, Close Enough for Government Work? Using Informal Procedures for 
Imposing Administrative Penalties, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1993) (describing variation in 
procedures used in assessing administrative penalties and urging consideration of an 
amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act to provide greater uniformity). 
15. See JONATHAN M. KARPOFF, JOHN R. Lorr, JR., & GRAEME RANKINE, 
ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS, LEGAL PENALTIES, AND REPlJTATIONAL COSTS 13 (1999) 
(reporting differences in environmental regulatory awards imposed across different media); 
KELLY KRJSTEN LEAR, AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF EPA ADMINISTRATIVE PENA LTIES 32, 
35 , 40 (1998) (reporting variation in EPA fines across different statutes). 
16. See, e.g., Health Care Financing Administration, Civil Money Penalties for 
Nursing Homes, 64 Fed. Reg. 13354-01 (Mar. 18, 1999). 
17. See BREYER, supra note 4, at 24-27; see also infra notes 60-66 and accompanying 
text. 
18. Sunstein et al., supra note 8, at 1191. 
19. !d. They also compare the penalties for OSHA violations with the awards 
available in cases of employment discrimination. 
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penalties: the parking ticket. The current penalty for unauthorized parking in 
an area designated for the handicapped is $25 on the grounds of Harvard 
University or at the Boston campus of the University of Massachusetts, but it is 
$75 in the city of Boston and $100 in the city of Cambridge. In New York 
City, a handicapped parking violation yields a $180 penalty. Except in the city 
of Boston, these penalties are higher than the penalties for parking next to a fire 
hydrant: $15 at Harvard University and the University of Massachusetts; $75 in 
Boston; $25 in Cambridge; and $55 in New York City. 
Even within the same jurisdiction, penalties can vary across different 
regulatory contexts. Children in day care centers in New York are protected by 
maximum penalties of $200 a day imposed for regulatory violations that place 
children "at risk of physical, mental, or emotional harm," and $500 a day for 
violations that place them "at risk of death, serious or protracted disfigurement, 
or protracted impairment of physical or emotional health."20 Interestingly, the 
able-bodied person who parks in a handicapped parking spot in New York City 
will pay about the same penalty in any given day as will someone in the city 
who is found to have violated day care regulations in a way that puts a child at 
risk of harm.21 Residents in nursing homes, in contrast, are protected by a 
uniform maximum penalty level of up to $1000 per day of violation. 22 
As these examples show, civil penalties can vary greatly across a broad 
range of regulations. Variation in regulatory penalties, however, does not 
necessarily equate to a problem of regulatory incoherence. Variation simply 
means that there are different penalties associated with various offenses, not 
necessarily that they are incoherent. In contrast, incoherence describes a 
pattern of penalties that, to use Sunstein et al. 's words, "do not make sense.''23 
The way in which a pattern of penalties or other regulatory policies makes no 
sense should be thought of in normative terms-not positive or empirical ones. 
It may be possible to explain the variation in policies empirically in terms of 
various cognitive, political, or social factors, but still also possible to criticize 
the overall pattern of penalties in normative terms. 
20. The penalty for a Class II violation of New York's day care regulations is a 
maximum of $200 per day. N .Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 1 8 , § 413. 3 (2001). The 
penalty for Class I violations that place a child at "risk of death, serious or protracted 
disfigurement, or protracted impairment of physical or emotional health" is a maximum of 
$500 per day. !d. 
2 1. Actually, the penalty for handicapped parking violations has no daily l imit,  but the 
penalty for day care violations does. A lso, the penalties for Class III violations of day care 
regulations-those violations which do not place children at risk of harm-is only $50  per 
day, slightly less than for general parking violations in New York City. 
22. N.Y.  COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 1 8, § 414.4 (2001) (specifying maximum 
penalties of up to $ 1 000 per day for violations of nursing home regulations). 
23. Sunstein et al . ,  supra note 8, at 1 1 56 .  The particular test of coherence for Sunstein 
et al. is whether "the ranking of two or more cases [is] the same when they are directly 
compared and when they are judged in isolation." !d. at 1 1 72 .  
• 
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Regulatory outcomes that are incoherent can be justifiably criticized as 
inefficient, unfair, or perhaps both. From the standpoint of overall welfare, 
incoherent outcomes fail to deploy resources in a socially optimal way, such as 
by bringing too little regulatory attention to bear on the most significant public 
problems and too much attention on the least significant. 24 Incoherent 
regulatory policies can also result in situations where some individuals find 
themselves more protected than similarly situated others and where some 
individuals and firms are more scrutinized by governmental oversight than are 
similarly situated others. 
Regulations "do not make sense" in a variety of ways. I will distinguish 
between two types of coherence: instrnmental coherence and comparative 
coherence.25 To test for instrumental coherence is to consider whether 
regulatory strategies or means are consistent with appropriate regulatory goals 
or ends. A regulatory policy fails to make instrumental sense if it fails to 
achieve its objectives or if it produces more harm than good. Regulatory 
policies are often criticized for being instrumentally incoherent because they 
are ineffectual, produce unintended consequences, or impose far too many 
costs for the social benefits they achieve. 26 
Judging a regulation to be instrumentally incoherent depends only on 
making a judgment about the particular regulation. While knowledge of the 
performance of other regulations may provide clues that help in judging the 
instrumental coherence of another regulation, a judgment about the 
instrumental coherence of a given regulation can be made in isolation of 
judgments about other regulations. In contrast, a regulation fails to make sense 
comparatively if it turns out to be inconsistent with other regulations of either 
the same general type or other types altogether. This inconsistency could arise 
between ends, between means, or between the relationships between means and 
ends. 
Sunstein et al. usefully distinguish further between two types of 
comparative coherence: within category and across category coherenceY 
Regulations or their outcomes can be said to be coherent within category if 
they are consistent with other regulations or outcomes of their same general 
type.28 Regulations or their outcomes can be said to be coherent across 
24. Of course, uniform policies can also result in a misallocation of resources when 
they are applied across a varied range of conditions. For a discussion of the 
unreasonableness of applying uniform rules, see EuGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, 
GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 58-71 ( 1982). 
25. This distinction seems implicit in Sunstein et al . ,  supra note 8, at 1160 ("[W]e do 
not suggest that coherence is sufficient to produce good outcomes."). 
26. W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR 
RisK 248 ( 1992) (noting widespread criticism that government regulations are costly and 
"ineffective in promoting their intended objectives"). 
27. Sunstein et al ., supra note 8, at 1154, 1157, 1163. 
28. !d. at 1172 
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category only if the overall pattern of regulations or outcomes makes sense 
across different regulatory categories. 29 
To illustrate these distinctions, return to the example of civil penalties for 
regulatory violations. Such penalties would be judged instrumentally 
incoherent if they were set at a level that failed to achieve the goal of reducing 
the socially undesirable ends that they were intended to deter. For instance, we 
might imagine a world in which the maximum penalty for a serious violation of 
an OSHA regulation was only a nickel per year. 30 It would "make no sense" 
instrumentally to adopt such a ridiculously low penalty because that level 
would effectively have the same deterrent effect as no penalty at alP1 On the 
other hand, a maximum penalty of a nickel per year could be viewed as 
comparatively consistent if that penalty did not seem out of line with the 
penalties for other types of violations. If the maximum penalties for non­
serious OSHA violations were less than a nickel per year, then having 
maximum penalties for serious OSHA violations of a nickel per year would 
seem comparatively coherent within the category of OSHA violations. If 
maximum penalties for other less serious regulatory violations outside c+ 
OSHA were also lower, then the nickel-per-year penalty could be thought of as 
comparatively coherent across categories. 
In an ideal world we would expect a regulatory system to achieve both 
instrumental and comparative coherence. 32 Yet achieving both is challenging 
in no small part because it requires decisionmakers to obtain competing types 
of information. Instrumental coherence tends to call for depth, while 
comparative coherence tends to call for breadth. To achieve instrumental 
coherence, regulatory designers focus on solving the problem at hand, on 
identifying concrete strategies to achieve relatively narrow regulatory goals. 
Comparative coherence, in contrast, requires decisionmakers to step back and 
assess the landscape, to make comparisons. 
To be sure, efforts aimed at standardizing information collection and 
decision modeling across policy areas can lower the costs of making 
comparisons, and they are to be desired for this very reason.33 Yet even with 
much needed efforts of standardization, information will never be costless. 
Decisionmakers with limited time and resources confront choices about how to 
29. !d. 
30. Though obviously an extreme hypothetical, this example may resonate with sports 
fans who complain that penalties for technical fouls and other transgressions on the 
basketball court are comparably trivial. See Doug Robinson, Big-Time Players Pay Small­
Time Fines, DESERET NEWS, Jan. 20, 200 I .  
3 1. Correspondingly, we could easily imagine a penalty that was rid iculously high, 
such as shutting down a facility entirely on the finding of one minor violation. 
32. Cf James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uni form Environmental Standards in a 
Federal System-And Why It Matters, 54 Mo. L. REv. 1226 (1995) (cal ling for "wise" 
consistency in environmental regulation). 
33. See infra note 86 and accompanying text. 
• 
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invest in information gathering, and one such choice is between gathering the 
information needed to achieve instrumental coherence and gathering that 
needed to achieve comparative coherence. 
For some purposes, though, it will be necessary to invest in both kinds of 
information. If we are interested in assessing the comparative coherence of 
regulatory strategies, including the size of civil penalties, information about 
instrumental coherence will be necessarily relevant. This is because regulators 
often must adapt policies to different conditions to achieve instrumental 
coherence, employing different strategies for situations that may be similar in 
some respects but which differ in others. Since the social and economic 
conditions for which regulatory standards, practices, and penalties are designed 
vary, these standards, practices, and penalties also need to vary in order to 
achieve regulatory goals effectively. A well-crafted, instrumentally coherent 
system of regulatory policy will therefore exhibit a high degree of variation 
both within and across regulatory categories, and for this reason will be more 
likely to appear on the surface to be comparatively incoherent.34 
This is not to say that instrumental reasons will always explain variation in 
regulatory outcomes, but simply that a fair and full assessment of the degree of 
comparative coherence in a regulatory system should take into account whether 
there are valid, instrumental reasons why regulatory strategies vary in 
seemingly incoherent ways. In other words, to identify comparative 
incoherence in regulatory strategies it will often be necessary to seek depth as 
well as breadth. Identifying comparative incoherence in such cases involves 
consideration of variation in the conditions and constraints across policy areas 
as well as variation in regulatory outcomes. To judge comparative coherence is 
therefore to ask whether the differences in these underlying conditions, as well 
as in the overarching goals, justify differences in regulatory strategies. 
II. INCOHERENCE AND CIVIL PENALTIES 
Sunstein et al. recognize the difficulties of identifying comparative 
coherence, but they also suggest that there are "obvious anomalies" across 
34. It is quite possible, of course, that seeking instrumental coherence in a variety of 
separate regulatory realms will lead to genuine comparative incoherence across these realms. 
Myopic optimization on separate parts of a problem can result in the suboptimization of the 
larger problem. See GEORGE L. NEMHAUSER & LAURENCE A. WOLSEY, INTEGER AND 
COMBINATORIAL OPTIMIZATION 60, 393-94 (1988) (describing how "greedy" or "myopic" 
algorithms generally fail to yield optimal results). Certainly, this is easy to see when judging 
regulatory outcomes. A regulatory system filled with a series of instrumentally coherent 
policies aimed at trivial problems, but which left major problems completely unaddressed, 
would properly be judged incoherent in a comparative sense. For an excellent elucidation of 
this kind of argument, see BREYER, supra note 4, at I I  (describing the problem of "tunnel 
vision," whereby "each employee's individual conscientious performance effectively carries 
single-minded pursuit of a single goal too far, to the point where it brings about more hann 
than good"). 
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categories that would lead people to conclude that the overall system makes 
little sense.35 They point specifically to the $7000 penalties available for 
OSHA violations and the $25,000 penalties available for violations of the Wild 
Bird Conservation Act, claiming that "[i]t is extremely doubtful that the public 
would support that pattern of penalties, taken as a whole."36 As a matter of 
predicting public opinion, perhaps this is correct, especially if the public has 
little information about regulatory penalties and the conditions under which 
they are applied. Yet such judgments of incoherence can themselves be limited 
by people's cognitive capacities. When trying to compare two or more 
regulatory systems, people may focus simply on the perceived importance of 
the underlying regulatory goal when it would be relevant to take other factors 
into account in making an informed judgment about the coherence of different 
regulatory systems. 
Individuals may have a tendency to "see" incoherence when on closer 
examination there is none. The same cognitive tendencies that Sunstein et al. 
have so carefully illuminated would lead us to expect that this would occur 
quite often. If individuals have a tendency to take up problems "one case at a 
time," they presumably have a tendency to focus only on one factor at a time 
when making comparisons across categories. This will lead them in some 
cases to focus on incoherence along one dimension, but to overlook other 
dimensions that might justify differences across categories. 
The general point is that regulatory policies can sensibly and justifiably 
vary, and that ordinary people's judgments about what they find obviously 
incoherent may themselves be either incoherent or wrong. When it comes to 
regulatory violations, there are a number of possible reasons why civil penalties 
could sensibly vary even if more serious violations are backed up by lower 
penalties than are less serious violations. When other considerations are taken 
into account, differences that might seem obviously problematic may well be 
justified. For example, rather than an obvious case of incoherence, the case of 
OSHA civil penalties probably better illustrates the difficulties in judging 
incoherence across categories. Additional factors relevant to identifying 
incoherence in regulatory penalties would include the following. 
A. Existence of Other Liability 
In some cases, civil penalties will not be the only financial sanction 
confronting those who violate regulations. For example, employers who fail to 
provide a safe workplace can find themselves exposed to more than just the 
possibility of civil penalties imposed by the federal OSHA. They also can face 
35. Sunstein et al., supra note 8, at 1186. Elsewhere in the article, they also refer to 
"[s]candalously large inconsistencies" in policy, though it is not clear whether they have 
civil penalties in mind. /d. at 1156. 
36. /d. at 1191; see also id. at 1192. 
I 
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workers' compensation claims, tort liability (including possible pumtlVe 
damages), and higher wagesY Indeed, the violation of an OSHA standard may 
itself sometimes provide a basis for claims of negligence in tort litigation. In 
contrast, those who import wild birds in contravention of the federal statute 
face no similar exposure to additional liability. Hence, it can make sense to 
have lower administrative penalties for more serious regulatory offenses if 
offenders are also subject to other kinds of liability or non-regulatory 
penalties.38 
B. Availability of Alternative Remedies 
Regulators in some instances will also have available other remedies to 
ensure compliance or to correct problems created by regulatory violations. 
OSHA, for example, can obtain injunctive relief, such as closing down a 
workplace entirely;39 but the Fish and Wildlife Service has no comparable 
injunctive relief available to it. Similarly, a handicapped person cannot move a 
car that is parked illegally in a spot designated for handicapped only, but, if 
necessary, firefighters can break into and move a car that is in the way of a fire 
hydrant. In those cases where injunctive relief or other alternative remedies are 
available, it makes sense that civil penalties would not be as high. Especially 
when injunctive remedies include shutting down a business, the effective 
penalties imposed on violators will be substantial regardless of the specific fme 
levied by statute.40 
C. The State of Mind of the Violators 
Sometimes those who violate regulations do not even know that they are 
doing so. All things being equal, civil penalties against those who 
unintentionally breach regulations probably do not need to be as large as those 
37. See W. KIP VISCUSI, JOHN M. VERNON & JOSEPH E. HARRfNGTON, JR., ECONOMICS 
OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 8 1 4  (2d ed. 1995) (noting that OSHA's civil penalties 
amount to no more than about $25 million per year nationwide, compared with $70 bi l lion in 
higher wages associated with workplace risks, and workers' compensation premiums of 
more than $20 bil l ion). 
38. In addition to government-imposed l iability or penalties, there also can be negative 
market consequences associated with regulatory violations. Productivity may be diminished 
in finns that are cited for regulatory violations or, alternatively, boosted in those firms that 
pass regulatory inspections. Workers generally demand higher wages in industries with 
larger safety risks. Customer reactions or responses by insurers may also be a consideration 
for finns which are cited for certain  kinds of regulatory violations. 
39. See 29 U.S.C. § 662 ( 1 999). In those cases where OSHA improperly fail s  to seek 
injunctive relief, the statute allows employees or their representatives to seek it themselves. 
40. See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 24, at 53 (noting that injunctive reli ef imposes 
an "expense [that] is usually equivalent to a much larger fine than a court would ever 
impose"). 
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imposed against knowing or willful violators.41 The seemingly striking 
disparity between the $7000 OSHA penalty and the $25,000 wild bird penalty 
appears to be at least partially explainable on this basis. The $25,000 
maximum penalty under the Wild Bird Conservation Act is specifically for any 
person who "knowingly" violates the relevant regulations or for any person 
engaged in the business of importing exotic birds, who presumably knows or 
should know of the regulations.42 The Act assesses a maximum civil penalty of 
only $500 for a person who otherwise violates its regulations.43 In comparison, 
OSHA authorizes a maximum penalty of $70,000 for any employer who 
"willfully" violates worker safety regulations.44 The $7000 maximum penalty 
is for employers who unintentionally violate the regulations.45 While subtle 
differences might be drawn between "knowingly" and "willfully," when the 
state of mind of the violator is taken into account it becomes less clear that the 
companson between OSHA and Fish and Wildlife Service penalties is 
incoherent. 
D. Distance Between Legal Rule and Outcome of Concern 
Regulations aim to reduce undesirable outcomes in the world, but it is 
often infeasible to set a regulatory standard based directly on the undesirable 
outcome. Instead, regulators must often write standards that aim either at 
proxies for the outcome of concern or at other factors believed to be correlated 
with the outcome of concern.46 Perhaps lower penalties are justified for 
violations of regulations that rely on proxies or aim at behavior that is only 
correlated with the ultimate outcome of concern, even though the ultimate 
outcome may be more serious. Parking next to a fire hydrant does not itself 
cause fires, while parking in a handicapped parking spot does diminish access 
for those who are physically challenged. A well-designed regulatory system 
aimed at worker health and safety may require employers to complete various 
41. It is not simply that those who knowingly or willfully violate regulations deserve 
larger penalties for punitive reasons. Since they knew of the law and broke it anyway, it 
may take a larger penalty to deter them from future violations or to send an optimal signal to 
other regulated entities that they should follow all the laws they know about. In those cases 
where violators unknowingly break the law, simply informing them of their obligations can 
sometimes go a long way toward getting them to achieve compliance and therefore the 
penalty will not need to be as large. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3-5 
( 1 990) (discussing reasons why people obey the law other than simply to avoid penalties). 
42. 1 6  U.S .C. § 49 1 2(a)( l )(A) (2000). 
43. !d.§ 49 1 2(a)( l )(C). 
44. 29 U.S .C. § 666(a) (1994). OSHA also adds a statutorily-required tmmmum 
penalty of $5000 for willful violations, something which is absent from the Wild Bird 
Conservation Act's provisions. !d. 
45. !d. § 666(b ) .  
46. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM I 04-05 ( 1 982). 
-
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forms, but completing government-required paperwork presumably is not as 
serious as the underlying goal of worker safety itself.47 
E. Type and Size of Regulatory Targets 
The behavioral impact of a civil penalty can vary depending cin the 
resources of the regulated entity and the economic gains to the firm from 
contravening the regulation. For this reason, penalties for regulations that 
target individuals and small businesses need not be set at levels as high as those 
for other, less serious offenses that govern larger firms.48 In some states, for 
example, the penalties associated with violating state rules governing the 
operation of day care facilities are limited to no more than a couple hundred 
dollars per violation.49 In contrast, the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission can impose up to $100,000 or triple the economic gain for 
manipulating market prices.50 The Securities and Exchange Commission can 
impose penalties on firms up to $250,000 or the amount of the economic gains 
from the violation (whichever is higher) for fraud or manipulation.51 This 
pattern does not necessarily mean that the well-being of children is valued less 
than fraud-free securities markets, nor does it mean that the civil penalties 
across these categories are incoherent. Rather, the pattern across these 
categories makes better sense if we consider that there are smaller economic 
gains to be had from violating day care standards than from committing 
securities fraudY 
47 .  The system of penalties for OSHA violations appears to take this factor into 
account, as non-serious violations, such as failures to file required paperwork, are 
distinguished from "serious" violations, which pose a substantial risk to worker safety. 29 
U.S.C. § 666(k) ( 1 994) (defining "serious" violations as those for which a "substantial 
probability that death or serious physical hann could result"). The same statute also allows 
OSHA to issue a simple notice of violation for "de minimis violations which have no direct 
or immediate relationship to safety or health." !d. § 658(a). 
48. Sometimes regulators have found that simply sending a letter to small businesses, 
notifying them of applicable regulations, is sufficient to induce compliance. See ELIZABETH 
SCHEEHLE, IMPROVING SMALL BUSINESS ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE THROUGH 
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS: A CASE STUDY ON UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANKS ( 1 999) 
(policy analysis exercise prepared for the Progressive Policy Institute). 
49. ARJZ. REv. STAT. § 3 6-89 1 (2002) (maximum fine of $100 per violation); CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1 596.(West 2002) (general limit of $50 per violation, not to 
exceed $ 1 50 per day); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3 1 ,  § 345 (200 1 )  ($ 1 00 maximum fine); Mo. 
CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-557. 1 (2002) ($250 fine for the first violation by a family day 
care home). 
50. 7 u.s.c. § 9 (2000). 
51. 1 5  U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(ii) (2000). 
52. An interesting, and perhaps extreme, case of taking into account violators' 
resources can be found in Finland. Finnish traffic fines vary according to the violator's 
income-a system which recently resulted in highly-publicized case of a business executive 
receiving the equivalent of a $ 1 03,600 fine for driving his motorcycle at 4 7 miles per hour in 
1 230 STANFORD LA W REVIEW [Vol. 54: 12 17 
F. Probability ojDetecting Violations 
The deterrent effect of regulatory penalties depends not merely on their 
size, but also on the probability that a regulatory agency will detect violations 
of the applicable regulations. 53 This probability will depend on the amount of 
inspection resources available to the regulatory agency, the number of 
regulated entities to be inspected, and the ease with which government 
inspectors can detect a violation. 54 If less serious violations are harder to detect 
than more serious violations, regulatory agencies may need larger penalties, all 
things being equal, to achieve an optimal level of deterrence. 55 
G. Probability of Imposing Penalties 
Once an agency detects a violation, it must then proceed through a process 
of imposing that penalty. Penalties that can be assessed directly by a regulatory 
agency will likely have a higher probability of being imposed than will 
a 30 mile per hour zone. See Tech Executive Appeals $100, 000 Speeding Fine, L.A.  TIMES, 
Jan. 1 5 , 2002, at A4. 
53. For prominent discussions of optimal deterrence, see Gary S. Becker, Crime and 
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 1 69 ( 1 968) and A.  Mitchell Polinsky 
& Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, 24 J. PUB. ECON. 89 ( 1 984). 
54. The probability of detection may also depend on the availability of private forms of 
monitoring, including union complaints and citizen suits. See John T. Scholz, Can 
Government Facilitate Cooperation?  A n  Informational Model of OSHA Enforcement, 4 1  
AM.  J .  POL. SCI. 693 ( 1 997) (finding that OSHA inspections prompted by worker complaints 
serve to reduce injuries without regard to the amount of penalty imposed). 
55. Admittedly, people generally express little interest in or even understanding of 
probability in their decision making. See James K. Hammitt & John D. Graham, Willingness 
to Pay for Health Protection: Inadequate Sensitivity to Probability?, 8 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 33 ( 1 999); Robin M. Hogarth & Howard Kunreuther, Decision Making Under 
Ignorance: Arguing with Yourself, 1 0  J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 1 5  ( 1 995); Oswald Huber, 
Roman Wilder & Odilo Huber, A ctive Information Search and Complete Information 
Presentation in Naturalistic Risky Decision Tasks, 95 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 1 5  ( 1 997); 
Howard Kunreuther, Nathan Novemsky & Daniel Kahneman, Making Low Probabilities 
Useful, 23 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 1 03 (200 1 ); Cass Sunstein, Probability Neglect: 
Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law (Mar. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
www.ksg.harvard.edu/cbg/Events/Papers/RPP _ 4-2-02_Sunstein.pdf. In addition, ordinary 
people do not appear to favor taking the probability of detection into account when setting 
penalty levels. Sunstein et al., supra note 8,  at 1 1 67 n.50; Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade 
& Dani el Kahneman, Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 237 , 2 4 1 -44 
(2000). That said, this does not mean that the probability of detection is irrelevant to 
considered judgments about the sensibility of civil penalties for regulatory violations. Both 
regulators and analysts accept that administrative penalties are intended to provide 
deterrence and to give regulatory officials tools to affect behavior in order to achieve 
socially desirable goals. Moreover, not everything that is  important is immediately 
understood or valued by the public. Even though Sunstein et al. argue that people have little 
interest in global coherence, for example, they do not conclude that coherence is for that 
reason irrelevant to the design of good and just public policy. 
• 
June 2002] BOUNDED EVAL UA TION 123 1 
penalties that require a court determination at the outset in order to be 
imposed.56 In their study of regulatory enforcement, Eugene Bardach and 
Robert Kagan noted the trend toward authorizing regulatory agencies to impose 
penalties without first having to go to court, observing that while "[m]ost 
agency-assessed civil penalties, such as those imposed by OSHA, are not 
large, . . .  they are swift and according to our interviews, are troubling even to 
very large corporations."57 A penalty presumably does not need to be quite as 
large if it is swift and certain.58 Those who seek to compare penalties across 
regulatory categories would do well therefore to consider the differences in 
how penalties are imposed on violators. 
H. Implications for Judging Incoherence 
As this review of additional considerations suggests, vanat10n in factors 
other than simply the seriousness of the regulatory goal can justify variation in 
the amount of civil penalties. Once additional factors such as those described 
above are taken into account, the differences between OSHA and Fish and 
Wildlife Service penalties do not appear to be as obviously incoherent at they 
initially may have seemed. First, the statutory penalties for OSHA violations 
are in fact substantially higher than the penalties for importing wild birds once 
the category of OSHA penalties for willful violations is used for comparison. 
Second, OSHA penalties are backed up by other significant behavioral 
incentives for workplace safety, including workers' compensation and tort 
liability, whereas penalties for wildlife regulations are not. Finally, unlike the 
Fish and Wildlife Service, OSHA has injunctive relief available to it that can 
result in additional, significant costs imposed on firms that threaten worker 
safety. 
Of course, I make no claim to have fully analyzed all the differences 
between OSHA and Fish and Wildlife Service penalties, let alone the pattern of 
available or actually imposed penalties across other agencies.59 Nevertheless, 
56. See Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 5 1 0  U. S .  200, 2 1 0- 1 1 ( 1 994) (discussing 
congressional decision to streamline the process of imposing civil penalties under the 1 977  
Mine Act in  order to  enhance the deterrent effect of  the penalties). 
57 . BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 24, at 52. 
58. Moreover, the larger the penalty, the greater the incentive a firm has to contest its 
imposition, thus reducing the l ikelihood it will be imposed. See Surabhi Kadambe & 
Kathleen Segerson, On the Role of Fines as an Environmental Enforcement Tool, 4 1  J. 
ENVTL. PLANNING & MGT. 2 1 7  ( 1 998). 
59. It  is  possible that the statutory maximum levels available to OSHA are too low 
when compared with those in other risk-based statutes, or that in practice the civil penalties 
imposed by OSHA and other agencies are less coherent than their statutory m aximum levels 
would appear. We do know, for instance, that the average civil penalty issued by OSHA in 
some sectors amounts to less than a thousand dollars per violation. See, e.g. , David Wei!, 
Assessing OSHA Pe1jormance: Evidencefrom the Construction fndusl!y, 20 J. PUB. POL. & 
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taking into consideration a broader range of relevant factors makes it less 
obvious that disparate penalties make no sense. Furthermore, the reason for the 
difficulty in identifying incoherence of existing regulatory policy is only partly 
the individual cognitive tendencies emphasized by Sunstein et al. The 
difficulty arises because of those tendencies combined with the complexity of 
regulatory policy and the conditions under which it is established and 
implemented. As challenging as it can be simply to determine how much more 
important worker safety is than the protection of wild birds, the cognitive 
demands become still greater when other dimensions of different regulatory 
problems are taken into account. 
Unlike in the experimental setting, where researchers can control the 
factors that might affect individual judgments, identifying incoherence in 
practice demands attention to several dimensions all at once, because 
differences on one or more of these dimensions can sometimes justify variation 
in policies and outcomes. As a result, when viewed along one dimension, 
regulatory policies may appear incoherent, but when other factors are taken 
into account the policies may well make better sense. Of course, it is also 
possible that in some cases they will make even less sense. The point is that if 
we only look at one dimension at a time our judgments of incoherence will 
themselves be bounded and quite possibly mistaken. Furthermore, since 
variation across several dimensions will almost always be greater across rather 
than within regulatory categories, this will exacerbate if not even help explain 
the difficulties people experience in identifying across-category incoherence. 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS 
People's  tendency to focus on just one dimension when judging the 
coherence of different policies extends beyond the realm of administrative 
penalties. Some of the most prominent illustrations of regulatory incoherence 
are studies focusing on the cost-effectiveness of different regulations in terms 
of saving lives. In the 1 980s, the Office of Management and Budget released a 
table purporting to show wide variation in the cost-effectiveness of regulations 
across various domains, a table which has been revised, expanded, and cited 
widely in debates over regulatory reform.60 More recently, Tammy Tengs and 
her colleagues undertook an extensive study which found remarkable variation 
in the costs per life-year-saved across regulatory realms, from a median of 
$23,000 per life-year-saved at the Federal Aviation Administration to a median 
MGMT. 65 1 ,  656 tbl .2  (reporting that the total OSHA inspection of a construction site 
resulted in penalties of $ 7 1  I ). 
60. See Sunstein et al . ,  supra note 8, at 1 1 98 (noting that the OMB table "has come to 
dominate many discussions of these problems"). See generally Lisa Heinzerl ing, Regulatory 
Costs of Mythic Proportions, I 07 YALE L.J. 1 98 1  ( 1 998) (detai ling the history and 
prominence of the OMS table and questioning i ts validity and relevance). 
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of $7 .6  million per life-year-saved at the Environmental Protection Agency.6 1 
Sunstein et al. point to this variation in the cost-effectiveness of regulations, 
suggesting that it reveals more predictable incoherence brought about by 
cognitive tendencies. They even include in their article a table of government 
regulations showing economic costs ranging from $100,000 to $5 .7 trillion per 
life saved.62 
Wide variation in the cost-effectiveness of different regulations has 
become a matter of concern because it suggests that society could save more 
lives for the same commitment of resources if government were to reallocate its 
priorities .63 However, for the purpose of assessing the coherence of regulatory 
standards, a focus on their cost-effectiveness in terms of saving lives is actually 
quite narrow and even potentially misleading.64 The cost-effectiveness analysis 
that has dominated regulatory reform debates has focused attention on only one 
dimension of these regulations, albeit an important one-namely their impact 
on saving lives. A better approach would be to use an efficiency test that takes 
into account all the costs and benefits of different regulations. 
Regulations can achieve a wide range of social benefits over and above 
saving lives. As Tengs and her coauthors acknowledge, "interventions that 
reduce fatal injuries in some people may also reduce nonfatal injuries in others ; 
interventions designed to control toxins in the environment may have short­
tetm effects on [saving lives] , but also long-term cumulative effects on the 
ecosystem."65 As a result, cost variation that appears to make no sense when 
viewed simply in terms of lives saved could, in principle, make sense when 
these other social benefits are taken into account. 66 After all ,  a given regulation 
61. Tammy 0. Tengs, Miriam Adams, Joseph S. Pliskin, Dana G. Safran, Joanna E. 
Siegel, Milton C. Weinstein & John D. Graham, Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions 
and Their Cost-Effectiveness, 1 5  RISK ANALYSIS 3 69, 3 7 1  ( 1 995). For a recent comparison 
of the cost effectiveness of environmental regulations, see Robert Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, 
National Environmental Policy During the Clinton Years, in AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY 
IN THE 1 990s 583,  630 tb1.9.8 (Jeffrey A. Frankel & Peter R. Orszag eds., 2002) (reporting 
costs per statistical l ife saved in a dozen environmental regulations ranging from $9.4 bil l ion 
tO $40. 7  bi ll ion). 
62. Sunstein et al., supra note 8, app. E, at 1 2 1 4- 1 2 1 5 . 
63. Tammy 0. Tengs & John D. Graham, The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social 
Investments in Life-Saving, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS 
FROM REGULATION 1 67, 1 77 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1 996) (reporting that an additional 60,200 
l i ves could be saved each year by reallocating social investments across nearly 200 l ife­
saving strategies). 
64. See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 6 1 ,  at 630 n .87 (noting that "[t]o the extent that 
there are important nonmortality benefits, these [cost-per-life saved] studies may be 
misleading"); Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEG. STUDIE S 
l 059, 1 076 (2000) ("By itself, [a cost-effectiveness] table is insufficiently infonnative to tell 
people what they need to know."). 
65. Tengs et al. ,  supra note 6 1 ,  at 3 72. 
66. See Robert W. Hahn, Regu/at01y Reform: What Do the Government 's Numbers 
Tell Us?, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM REGULATION, 
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may well save only a few lives but prevent a vast number of nonfatal injuries or 
illnesses. It might make sense to adopt a regulation that would cost hundreds 
of millions of dollars per life saved if the regulation would also cure the 
common cold or prevent other more debilitating but nonfatal diseases. 
For this reason, the overall coherence of risk-related regulatory standards 
would be better judged by taking a broader perspective, just as in the case of 
civil penalties. Such a broad view would not only take into account all the 
social benefits, but would also take into consideration factors such as 
distributional equity.67 Consideration of all the relevant factors may well make 
sense out of regulatory standards that appear to make little sense when viewed 
along just one dimension, such as cost-effectiveness. 58 
Of course, no one has yet shown that the overall pattern of risk regulation 
currently in place is, all things considered, an optimal and coherent one, and it 
would be surprising if anyone could. The available evidence certainly appears 
to indicate otherwise. 59 My point here is simply that judgments of regulatory 
supra note 63, at 208, 229 ("[C]alculations that rely on cost-effectiveness to reallocate 
resources may be misleading because the ordering of cost-effectiveness measures may not be 
highly correlated with the ordering of net benefits associated with those m easures."). In 
addition, even when focusing only on mortality reduction, it may matter whether the l ives to 
be saved from a regulation are younger or older persons' lives. For thi s  reason, some 
analyses value mortality benefits based on life-years rather than just l ives saved. U.S .  
Environmental Protection Agency, Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses, No. EPA-
240-R-00-003 , 9 1  (Sept. 2000), available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epaleed.nsf/pages/guidelinesfiles/$file/Guidelines.pdf. 
67. Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 1 09 YALE 
L.J. 1 65, 246 ( 1 999) (arguing that "[cost-benefit analysis] must give way to important 
nonwelfarist concerns, such as deontological rights. An agency should not approve a proj ect 
that has a positive [net utility] if  it involves the unjustified sacrifice of an innocent."); 
Kenneth 1 .  Arrow, M aureen L. Cropper, George C. Eads, Robert W. Hahn, Lester B. Lave, 
Roger G. Noll, Paul R. Portney, Milton Russell ,  Richard Schmalensee, V. Kerry Smith & 
Robert N. Stavins, Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and 
Safety Regulation?, 272 SCIENCE 22 1 ,  222 ( 1 996) ("Factors other than aggregate economic 
benefits and costs, such as equity within and across generations, may be important in some 
decisions."); Richard H .  Pi ldes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. 
CHI .  L. REv. I ,  9 ( I  995) ("Regulations should be evaluated not only in terms of aggregate 
costs and benefits, but also in terms that reflect democratic judgments about qualitative 
differences among qualitatively different risks."). 
68. People may think, for example, that it is especially important to protect poor children 
from a certain risk in a geographically isolated area, and they may be willing to devote an 
unusually large amount to ensure that protection. What seems to be a cognitive error may 
tum out, on reflection, to be a judgment of value, and a judgment that can survive reflection. 
Sunstein, supra note 64, at 1 073 ; see also Celia Campbeli-Mohn & John S. Applegate, 
Learning from NEPA: Guidelines for Responsible Risk Legislation, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REv. 93 , I I  I ( 1 999) ("[I]t is unwise to set out a single substantive standard for all  regulation 
in the multifarious areas of federal activity without a full inquiry into the i mportant 
differences among the various areas."). 
69. For example, Robert Hahn has attempted to parse through the often incomplete 
data on nonfatal injuries and diseases in calculating the net benefits of a sample of 
environmental and health and safety regulations. Based on various agencies' studies, he 
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incoherence which are based solely on the cost-effectiveness of saving lives are 
themselves bounded and potentially misleading.70 Taking a broader 
perspective when making judgments about incoherence will yield different 
conclusions than result from a comparison made along j ust one dimension at a 
time.71 
Even though cost-effectiveness of lives saved is at best an incomplete 
measure of regulatory coherence, it has dominated discussions of regulatory 
reform in large part because of the relative lack of standardized data needed to 
use a broader measure such as net social benefits. 72 Methods of analysis vary 
greatly across regulatory realms, constraining analysts' and decisionmakers' 
ability to make reliable comparisons of a broader range of social benefits. In 
some realms decisionmakers rely on cost-effectiveness analysis of lifesaving 
interventions, while in other realms they seek to discern net benefits.73 
Different agenc1es use different methods of valuation and different discount 
concludes that many regulations stil l  fail to yield positive net benefits, even when benefits in 
addition to mortality reduction are estimated. Hahn, supra note 66,  at  2 1 9-22 1 .  
70. Hahn has shown that "[ c ]ost-effectiveness is quite sensitive to the measure that is 
used," potentially varying by more than a factor of ten depending on how effects other than 
fatalities are treated. !d. at 229. See also Adler & Posner, supra note 67, at 230  (arguing in 
favor of cost-benefit analysis because it is a multidimensional approach to decision analysis, 
capable of incorporating a wide range of factors) . 
7 1 .  Moreover, judgments about the cost-effectiveness of risk regulation can be affected 
by other data flaws. For example, the variation in cost-effectiveness across regulations may 
not be as wide as it would appear from the original and oft-cited OMB table, since many of 
the most costly regulatory proposals included in that particular table were never 
promulgated. Heinzerling, supra note 60, at 20 1 0. Furthennore, as others have 
acknowledged, the sample of regulations commonly used as a basis for judging the cost­
effectiveness of regulation is not a random one. Tengs et al . ,  supra note 6 1 ,  at 3 72 (noting 
that their analysis may be affected by selection bias because i t  is not a random sample of all 
life-saving interventions). As a result, it may be the case that the "larger view of the broader 
regulatory landscape" would show that there are "far more numerous examples of balanced, 
sensible, and cost-effective regulations." BREYER, supra note 4, at 28 .  Efforts to respond to 
incoherence may also be motivated by an overestimation of the problem because extreme 
anomalies are probably more readily available than are sensible consistencies. See Christine 
lolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 
STAN. L. REv. 1 47 1 ,  1 477 ( 1 998) (discussing the effects of  the availability heuristic on 
decisionmaking). 
72. Cost-effectiveness analysis also avoids controversies that surround the valuation of 
human l ives and the kinds of cognitive difficulties that attend to valuing other social benefits 
in monetary terms. Nevertheless, there would almost certainly be more attention to 
comparing net benefits across agencies than at present if there were better, more 
standardized data available. 
7 3 .  For an interesting comparison of the variation in analytical methods used in the 
environmental and medical fields, see Janice Claire Wright, Investments that Save Lives: 
The Norms of Environmental and Medical Decision Making 2- 1 4--2-20 ( 1 997) (unpublished 
Ph. D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with the Stanford Law Review). 
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rates . Many agencies do not quantify social benefits . 74 Others are prohibited 
by statute from considering the costs of their decisions. 75 With varied 
decisionrnaking standards and analytic methods across and within regulatory 
realms, it is exceedingly difficult to gather and systematically compare data in 
order to provide a more comprehensive evaluation of regulatory coherence. 
Sunstein et al. are right to observe that "[a ]s things now stand, the structure 
of those institutions charged with making regulatory and legislative decisions 
reinforces the effects of category-bound thinking."76 The same fragmented 
institutional environment that reinforces category-bound thinking also produces 
category-bound data and analysis .  Policymaking takes place in decentralized, 
diffuse, and circumscribed environments . The organization of the legislative 
branch of government into a myriad of committees and subcommittees leads to 
a high level of specialization.77 The people who work on and lobby for a given 
set of issues tend to be different people than those who work on similar issues 
in other networks or regulatory cultures.78 The network of relationships in 
Washington, D.C. exhibits a "hollow core," with very few individuals working 
across different policy areas .79 
The presence of multiple decisionmakers, each possessing different and 
perhaps even changing preferences, makes inconsistent decisions likely, if not 
inevitable, when statutes and regulatory agencies are created at different times 
and for different purposes.80 Even if actors were to take cognizance of policies 
in other categories, policy agendas tend to emerge around focal points and 
crises du j our.8 1  Policy decisions necessarily reflect the composition of the 
prevailing political coalition, which itself changes over time. Even if the 
decisionmakers were always the same (or their preferences were), their 
col lective decisions would not likely be coherent if their individual preferences 
74. Robert W. Hahn, Jason K. Burnett, Yee-Ho I.  Chan, Elizabeth A. M ader & Petrea 
R. Moyle, Assessing Regulatory Impact A nalyses: The Failure of Agencies to Comply with 
Executive Order 12. 866, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL ' Y  859, 869-70 (2000). 
75.  See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 53 1 U.S. 457, 47 1 (200 1 )  (holding 
that the Clean Air Act precludes the EPA from considering costs in setting national  ambient 
air quali ty standards). 
76.  Sunstein et al . ,  supra note 8, at 1 1 56. 
77. See KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 4-6 ( 1 99 1  ) . 
78. Errol Meidinger, Regulatory Culture: A Theoretical Outline, 9 LAW & POL ' Y  3 5 5 ,  
364-65 ( 1 987); Hugh Heclo, Issue Net>vorks and the Executive Establishment, in THE N EW 
AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 87, 99- 1 00 (Anthony King, ed. ,  1 978). 
79. JOHN P. HEINZ, EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, ROBERT L. NELSON & ROBERT H .  
SALISBURY, THE HOLLOW CORE: PRIVATE INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICY M AKING 236-3 7 
( 1 993). 
80. See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL S ECURITY 
DISABILITY CLAIMS 55 ( 1 983) (observing that "[s]ocial policy as legislatively crafted into 
programmatic directives should not be expected to emerge as a set of fully coherent 
approaches to unitary goals"). 
8 1 .  JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 1 7- 1 8 ( 1 9 84) . 
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fall across more than one dimension.82 It seems plausible that the two kinds of 
coherence I have distinguished here, namely instrumental and comparative 
coherence, are not well correlated and in fact may align along different 
dimensions. If so, then even if all policy actors were fully to consider both 
kinds of coherence, their policy preferences could be arrayed in such a way as 
to make impossible a coherent collective ordering of their preferences for 
different kinds of coherence. 
To be sure, policy fragmentation and the diffusion of multiple actors has its 
defenders, and for good reason.83 Robust, pluralistic policymaking may wel l be 
less coherent than rule by elite guardians, but its messiness could simply be a 
necessary price of democratic decisionmaking.84 In addition, dividing up the 
policy space can encourage the kind of specialization needed to enact policies 
that make more instrumental sense, and perhaps at the end of the day that 
matters more than complete comparative coherence.85 A division of 
policymaking authority may also foster healthy competition and the kind of 
innovation that is necessary for a good legal system.86 
The irony, of course, is that the same fragmentation that reinforces 
category-bound thinking and leads to incoherent policy j udgments also 
confounds efforts to assess and address the problem of incoherence due to the 
resulting incompatibilities in methods of data collection and policy analysis. 
To evaluate regulatory incoherence in a systematically coherent way, those 
interested in improving government regulation will need to consider more than 
just one dimension of regulatory policies at a time and will need standardized 
data across these various dimensions. They will need to seek to understand 
better whether incoherence exists, how significant and pervasive it is, and 
whether gains in coherence would be worth any possible costs in terms of the 
82. KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VA LUES I 0- 1 1 ( 1 95 1  ) .  
83.  As Sunstein et al. note, "coherence is not a trumping value, and a system 
displaying incoherence may well be better than one that is coherent but pervasively unjust." ' 
Sunstein et al . ,  supra note 8 ,  at 1 203.  
84.  ROBERT A.  DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 78-79 ( 1 989). 
85. The absence of intercircuit stare decisis among appellate courts, for example, 
would seem inevitably to lead to incoherence since it  penn its a national law to be interpreted 
and administered in one circuit in ways that are completely at odds with how it is interpreted 
and administered in another circuit. Yet it has been argued that this approach fosters 
intercircuit dialogue that "is l ikely to result in better decisions, as it wil l  produce a more 
careful and focused consideration of the issues." Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, 
Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J .  679, 736 ( I  989). For a 
similar discussion suggesting that the fragmented organizational structure of the U.S .  
Congress may promote better policymaking, see KREHBIEL, supra note 77, at  245;  KING, 
supra note 5, at 1 44-45 .. 
86. For example, Japan's  system of compensation for automobile accidents is  thought 
to be more coherent than that found in the United States, but Japan has achieved its greater 
consi stency by creating a more rigid, less adaptable legal system, which may create 
problems of its own. Takao Tanase, The Management of Disputes: Automobile Accident 
Compensation in Japan, 24 LAW & Soc ' y REv. 65 1 ,  68 1 ( 1 990). 
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values served by pluralistic diffusion.87 Perhaps this is partly what Sunstein et 
al. have in mind when they acknowledge that it is not "easy or even possible 
for people to agree on what full coherence actually requires."88 In addition to 
the difficulty of agreeing on full coherence, however, it may also be neither 
easy nor possible for people to agree on what the obvious anomalies are, or on 
whether and how to address them. 
CONCLUSION 
Sunstein et al. 's article raises important concerns about regulatory policy 
and the design of regulatory institutions. In articulating a cognitive basis for 
incoherent decisionmaking and identifying extensive, even puzzling, variation 
in regulatory policies, they lay down an ambitious challenge for reducing 
incoherence across regulatory policies. Yet in calling attention to some of the 
predictable consequences of making policy one case at a time, they also reveal 
that these same cognitive tendencies, in particular category-bound thinking, can 
affect judgments about the incoherence of government regulation. Evaluations 
of regulatory incoherence can be, and perhaps predictably wil l  be, bounded 
themselves. For this reason, rooting out incoherence will be more difficult than 
might be hoped, because policies that appear incoherent when evaluated 
narrowly may not be so incoherent after all. Policy differences that appear to 
be incoherent will in some cases instead be fully justified. The challenge for 
those who share the aspiration for systematic rationality in law is therefore to 
probe still more deeply and more broadly, and to search for a better 
understanding of the extent of regulatory incoherence, the tensions between 
instrumental and comparative coherence, and the institutional reform strategies 
that will ultimately make the most sense. 
87.  Efforts such as the OMB's guidelines for economic analysis are a step in the 
direction of creating a more unifonn system of data collection and analysis. Office of 
Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, A Report to the 
President on the Third Anniversary of Executive Order 1 2866 (Dec. 1 996), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/riaguide.html; Office of Management and Budget, 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Guidelines to Standardize Measures of Costs 
and Benefits and the Format of Accounting Statements (2000), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda!m00-08.pdf. The l iterature is also replete with 
suggestions for improving the quality and the impact of cost-benefit analysis in regulatory 
policymaking. See, e.g., Arrow et al . ,  supra note 67, at 222; Hahn, supra note 66, at 240-44. 
See also U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 66. 
88. Sunstein et al., supra note 8, at 1 203 . 
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